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Whenever one deals with an interactive decision situstion of long duration, one hss to talce into secount
thst prioritiee of the participsnts msy change during the conflict. In thia psper we propoee a,n extensive-
form game model to handle such situations snd suggest and study ~ solution concept, called credióle
equiliónum, which generalizes the concept of Naah equilibrium. We slso discuss poesible variante to this
concept and applicstions oC the model to other types oC gamea.i
1. Introduction
As far as we know, a game in which priorities change during the play was first discusaed
by Hotner in the story of Odysseus~Ulysaes and the sirena (Odysaey, c lOth century B.C.].
According to the story, the singing of the airena was renowned for ita beauty, and so
seductive that whcever heard it was lured to hia death.
Odysseus achieved his desire to hear the singing of the sirens in a way that game theorista,
often unjustifiably, ignore. He followed the principle~ that when people do not like the
rules of the game, they change the rulea. Thus Odyaseus invented a new, pure etrategy;
namely, he put wax in the eara of each of his sailora, commanding them to tie him to the
mast and not to release him until they were safely bound for home.
Lacking the creativity and imagination of Homer, we shall not follow this avenue and
regard our games as given and fixed.
Classical economics and game theory assume that an individual's preferences are con-
stant throughout the deciaion-making process, even if the latter has several atages. This
seemingly implausible assumption is of great theoretical value; in particular, it allowa a
multi-stage decision problem to be "collapaed~ to a single-atage one (see, e.g., Savage
(1954]), and enables aa extenaive game to be represented in a"normal" form, etc.
Yet, the fact that preferences may well change over time has been bothering economic
theorists for over four decades. Allais [1947] was probably the first (in modern times)
to deal with "exogenously" changing preferences, i.e., preferences which depend on time
alone. "Endogenous" changes in preferences, namely those resulting from the actiona of
the decision-maker or other players, were atudied in the early 1950's (see Schoeflier (1952]
and Harsanyi [1953J).
Situations in which priorities change are plentiful; people change, events influence our
perception of the world. When one is young one loves junlc food, both for its tsate and
for the opportunity its consumption gives to meet young friends, old and new, and have a
great time with them. As one gets older, one's stomach becomea more sensitive, one also
~ Expreexed by Mutin Shubik (oral communication).associates with different people, so junk food is no longer attractive. When one is young,
one wants to spend a lot of time on leiaure; when one geta older, providing for one's family
takes priority. One might enjoy watching ceremoniea of queer culta, but there is a poeitive
probability that one may become brainwashed, desert one's family and follow the cult-a
prospect that is not attractive before going to the ceremony. The reader can certainly
pmvide many more examples of changing prioritiea.
It is wise to take into account the posaibility of changing priorities in any long-range
plan. The question then becomea how to model theae aituations and what atrategies to
recommend, as well as what srategies are likely to be played. That ia the subject of this
paper.
Even a brief survey of the literature is beyond the scope of thie paper. A very partial
Gst of relevant worka includes Strotz [1956]; Pollak [1968]; Phelps and Pollak (1968]; Pollak
[1970J; Von Weiasaecker [1971]; Blackorby, Nissen, Primont, and Russell [1973J; Peleg and
Yaari [1973]; Hammond [1976]; Pollak [1976]. We will briefly discuss some of these in
Section 3, as a background to the presentation of our solution concept.
In Section 2 we present a.n extensive form model and discusa its relevance to our topic.
In Section 3 we propose strategy combinations, which we call credióle equiliória, to handle
the above situations. In Section 4 we show that the set of credible equilibria is identical to
the set of Nash equilibria if priorities do not change during the play. Thus, our solution is
an extenaion of the Nash non-cooperative solution to situationa in which priorities change
during the play. We then prove, among several other resulta, that the aet of credible
equilibria containa the set of perfect equilibria of the agent-form game; hence it is never
empty. Section 5 studies the set of credible equilibria. It shows, among other things,
that a credible equilibrium path is also a path of a Nash equilibrium for the agent-form
game. Section 6 provides some examples designed to illustrate characteristics of credible
equilibria. Section 7 showa that an extension of the concept to a model in which time ia a
part of the data does not yicld new equilibrium pointa. Section 8 discusses somc possible
variants of the concept.
Basically, we are dealing in this paper with individuals having various utilities during the3
play of a game. Thie suggests that our model could be applied to another, very important
class of situations, where a player is a group of individuala, s state, a party, etc. Such
a player is to some extent a decision-making unit, but it does not have a utility of its
own. Rsther, it represents various groupa, each endowed with its own utility function. For
example, a state may represent farmers, manufacturera, ordinary citizens, etc., but there
is no such thing as "a utility of the state". In Section 9 we diacuss the applicability of our
model to such situations and show that the scope of such application is limited. Thus, an
extension of our model is highly desirable.4
2. The Model
Wi~ start with a gamr. fnrm2 (T, P, U, C, p). Here, T is a tree, P- {Po, Pt ,..., P„} is the
playere' partition3 of the nodes of T(Po is the set of Chance's nodes); U- (Uo, Ui ,..., Un),
where U; -{u;j}~-~ is the partition of P; into information aeta4 (elementa of Uo are
singletons); C- {C(u;j)};-1,~,...,,,;j-1,z,..,,k; is a correspondence, where C(u;j) ia the aet
of choieea which are available to player i at information set u;j; p-{p(uoj)}j-1,z,,,,,ko is
a vector-valued function, where p(uoj) is a probability distribution on Chance's choices at
uoj. For further information concerning thia notation see, e.g., Selten [1975].
We aa~ume that the game form u a game of perfect recall in the sense of the following
definition (taken from Selten [1975]):
DEFINITION 2.1. A game form (T, P, U, C, p) is said to be of perfect recall if, for every i,
i- 1, 2, ..., n, and every two information sets u;j and u;k of the same player i, if one node
y, y E u;t, comes afters a choice c at u;j, then every node x in u;k comes after the same
choicc c.
By Kuhn's theorem (Kuhn [1953], Selten [1975]), we can and will restrict ouraelves to
behavioral strategies.
We shall also talk about the derived agent-form game, obtained by placing, for each i,
different agent~ i.j at the different information sets u;j of player i. Each agent i.j will
play dual roles: on the one hand we shall regard him as a decision-making unit that acts
in accordance with his own utility function. On the other hand, in reality he is the same
player i located at a certain stage of the. play. To complete the description of our mixlel,
we endow each agent i.j with a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function h;.j, defined
on lotteries over endpoints of T (which represent pure outcomea). Formally, therefore, our
~Le., a gsme in extensive form without payments at the endpoints.
~The players are 1,2, ...,n. `Chance' is denoted by 0.
~To complete the deacription, we add that for each informstion set u;j there are m(u;~ ) edgea going out
from each node of u;~. They are grouped into m(u;~ ) disjoint equivalent clasaea, where each equivalent
clssa conaiata o( one edge from each node of u;j. The equivs~ent claesea are cslled the choicu. We allow
in(ormstion seta with a aingle choice.
61.e., the path from the root to z contains an arc of choice c.5
game with utilitieaó changing during the play is a aix-tuple
(2.1) r-(T, P,U, c,n, h),
where T, P,U, C,p are as above, and h-(h~ , hz, ..., hn), where, for an endpoint z,
(2.2) h;(z) - (h~.t(z), h~.s(z), . .. , h~.t;(z))-
For some j's, and in particular for allj's such that i.j lies on the path from the root to
endpoint z, h;.~(z) ia the utility payment of agent i.j for the endpoint z of T. For other
j's h;.~(z) is allowed to be undefined.
DtseossfoN. The above construction comes to model a non-cooperative game in extenaive
form, in which the players' priorities may change during the play. To understand the
relation between "reality" and our model, we provide some explanation and also discuss a
possible objection to the model.
(1) As in classical game theory, an "outcome", represented by an eadpoint z of T, ia the
aggregate of everything that happens along the path form the root to the endpoint.
(2) We ahaU be interested in this paper in certain equilibrium pointa which, in one
application, can be viewed a9 possible agrcementa that can be reached by the players
at the start of the game. For thia application, every decuion muat be baaed on what
the playera think at the atart of the game. Accordingly, the function h;.~ should
be interpreted sa that utility function player i believea at the atart of the play he
wil! have when he reachea information aet u;~. We use here the words "believe~ or
"knows" in the sense of "ascribing probability one". (See the discussion in Aumann
and Brandenburger [1991] conceraing the relevance of thia meaning.) Thus, we
allow for the posaibility that later on a player will find out that what he knew was
wrong, in ways that he did not expect at aU. When a peraon takea a deciaion,
the only thing that matters is what he knowa, or believes, at the moment that the
decision takes place.
eWe uee the word "preferencea" when we diecuae the "resl" eituation. Their repreeentations in the math-
ematical model will uaually be called "utilities".s
(3) We assume that player i knows his utility function h;.~. There is no loss of general-
ity in this assumption. If he is not sure, being a Bayesian, he has some probability
distribution over vazious possible utility functions. This he can represent by in-
troducing chance moves as done in Harsanyi's theory of games with incomplete
information (Harsanyi [1968~). Similarly, there is no losa of generality in assuming
that all components of I' (in (2.1 )) are common knowledge.
(4) The utility functions aze merely numerical expressions for the agents' preferences.
Thus, tautologically one expects each agent to act in accordance with maximization
of his own utility function. This trivial remark is not always understood, and
the misunderstanding leads to a lot of confusion. Consider the 1-person game of
Figure 1.
1.1 Young-me
Figure 1. The young~old me game
In this game Li and L2 mean "spend on holiday vacations" and Ri and R2 mean
"save for home for the aged". We heard again a,nd again that the right thing for
agent 1.1 to do is to take Ri . Indeed, agent 1.2 will certainly choose R2i so agent
1.1 should cooperate in order to eventually enjoy a good home for the aged (100
is a pretty large number!). This reasoning is totally wrong: Had young-me cared
for old-me, this should have been reflected in 1.1's utility function. But the data
shows clearly that young-me prefers to spend money on va,cations rather than worry7
about old age. In fact, his preference is for travel when he becomes old (aee the 20),
but he believes that, as an old person, his priorities will be different; therefore, he
has no chance of getting the 20. Even without a theory, it ahould be clear that the
"right" solution for this gameT should be L1R2.
(5) Another question that is frequently asked is this: Why do we need a new model?
Is not the change of utilities simply a matter of gaining experience, or learning? To
explain this, let us compare the game in Figure 1 with the one in Figure 2.
1.1
Figure 2. Taking a course in modern muaic
In this game, player 1 is a person who cannot stand modern music. He believes,
however, that if he takes a course in modern music, he will get accustomed to thia
kind of music and learn to love it. Ll, L2 mean "stay homen. Rl means "take the
course". RZ means "listen to modern music~.a
In this case, contrary to the previous example, there is no change in the priorities
of the agenta. The utilities of the agents remain the same, in as much as they are
TFor those who sre not convinced, let us replsce the meming o[ L~, L~ to be"atay home", and Ri, Ry to
be "conaume hemin". Agent 1.2 ia slresdy addicted to heroin. Would one still claim thst s rstionsl agent
1.1 ahould choose Ri?
aWe put a blank as a utility for agent 1.2 after Li, because it makes no senae to tsllc about the utility of
an "educated" person (agent 1.2) for the proepect ot not being educated. However, we could define sgent
1.2 sa an agent of player 1 at s dale when the course ie over. With this interpretation, the blank could
have been replsced by 10.8
defined. Player 1 expects to learn how to enjoy modern music eud hia expectation
from the course matches what he believes will be after he takes the course. This
example is equivalent to the ordinary 1-person game of Figure 3.
10 10 20
Figure 3. A classical representatlon ot
the previous game
(6) A possible objection to our model is this: Following logical positivism, some people
feel that to talk about priorities is sheer "metaphysical nonsense" if they are not
derived by observing actual decisions. According to thia view, utilities must be
derived form actual revealed preferences. If only revealed preferences count, it
makes no sense to talk about revealed preferences of a future agent. How can one
observe at the present time commitments to be taken 20 yeara from now? This ia a
serious criticism and it requires an honest answere
(i) This is a criticism of the whole field of game theory, not only of our model.
In fact, there is hardly any application of game theory that is based on actual
measurements of utilities. Game theory (including our model, we hope) is useful
for the insight it sheds on real situations, for recommendations based on rough
evaluation of priorities, for theoretical analysis and for clarification of issues. But
we have to aclulit tllat actual measuremettts of utilities are usually impossible tuld,
in tlwse cr~ses wherc they are posslblC, thcy are unreliable. In this connection sr.e
Aumann ~1985J.
9This objection was raiaed also in Peleg nnd Yaari [1973].9
(ii) The belief that only revealed preferences count does not make much senseto
It can be criticized both on practical and theoretical grounda: With thia belief one
cannot measure, with any reasonable degree of preciaion, a cardinal utility auch as
the utility ofvon Neumann and Morgenstern. This ia because one cannot preaent the
players with simultaneous revealed-preference situationa. What is done cannot be
undone, and once a commitment ia taken (if taken serioualy), it cannot be cancelled.
The conceptual difficulty that we have with the revealed-preference view is this:
Suppose you decide, by obaerving some of his actiona, that a player prefers A to B
and B to C. What reason do you have to believe that he would have manifested
the same priorities had the choices been presented to him in a different order?
Experiments that cannot be repeated are of little value! Thus, restriction to revealed
preferences is not only useless, it is also questionable.
(iii) Whether we like it or not, people seldom measure utilities. They deduce
their priorities (and the priorities of othera) by introapection. To be aure, past
ex~ierietice takes part in this act of introspection and this includes observationa
of revealed preferences in similar aituations in the past, but the bottom line is
that important decisions are derived from prioritiea that result from introspection.
It is these priorities that count, even if they cannot be measured by an outside
observer.ll Now, if we are talking about introspection, it dces not matter much if
we discuss a present situation or a future one. If I want to estimate my priorities, say
20 years from now, I shall observe conditions and behavior of old people, perhaps
look at rudimentary available statistics about their illnesses and sufferings, and also
look for things that make them happy. I shall combine these facts (conaciously or
aubconsciously) with what I think I know about myself and-rightly or wrongly-
deduce my future priorities by introapection. It is the outcome of my introspection
that will dictate my decisions.
To sum up: Attempts to determine von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities by obaerving
people's behavior did not prove successful. In fact, experta on experimental economica~~
~oWe employ here the tactic that an sttack ia the beat defense...
~~Savage already recognized their importance when he diacuaeed "conceivable acta" (Savsge ~1972]).
~~Oral communicstion with R.einhard Selten and Martin Shubilc.io
claim that real people do not seem to behave as utility maximizers. One can take a view,
as expressed by John Harsanyi,13 that game theory is a theory about ideal people-people
who do not exist in the real world, and enjoy the subject for its sesthetic value. In thia aerue
our model ia certainly aa wejul aa the claaaicalone. And we can be more flexible, recognize
that decisions are made by the proceas of introapection, the results of which govern the
players' actions. Utility theory and game theory can help the decision-maker by leading
his thoughta to the required priority determinations, thereby "educating" him to be more
eystematic and logical, hoping that with this help hia decisiona will be reached faster and
with fewer "overaightsn. At any rate, both conceptually and prnctically, introspections
about future prospects are not more complicated than introspectiona about the present.
All the above has very little to do with another main application of game theory; namely,
to shed more light on conflict situations, to deepen our understanding of the conflict per
se, even though in reality most conflicts cannot be quantified. In this respect, our model
is certainly an interesting and useful extension of the classical one.
~~Oral communication.ll
3. Credible Equilibria
The purpoae of this paper is to generalize the concept of Nash equilibrium to gamea with
utilitien changiug during the play.
One idea that comes to mind is to recommend an agent-form Naah equilibrium. It
scrnts that auch att equilibriuin is satisfactory; no agent will deviate because, by deviation
alone, he has nothing to gain. Indeed, this recommendation was atudied in the important
paper of Peleg and Yaari [1973]. Neverthelesa we now feel that thia recommendation is not
good enough. The reason is that Nash equilibrium is robuat with respect to a deviation
of a single agent-not against deviation of several agents. But aeveral agents of the same
player can cooperate quite easily, to the benefit of all of them, becawe they are all tht same
individual Thus, an agent-form Nash equilibrium is not neceasarily atable. It aeema that
what we need is some kind of coalition-proof equilibrium,14 where coalitions are restricted
to agents of the same player. Unfortunately, if we extend that definition directly, we may
easily reach situations in which no such equilibrium exists. Moreover, we may unjuatifiably
reject "gcxid" points: Suppose a strategy combination ia rejected because acertain coalition
of agents of a player can deviate and do better-it may well be that thia deviation will
not be obeyed, because some agents of the same player (not necessarily a aubaet of the
deviating players) can do better after the deviation is "adopted" and cause losa to some
members of the deviating coalition. If this is the case, the original strategy combination
seems to us quite reasonable.
To overcome the above difficulties, we introduce here the concept "credible deviation",
defined recursively, and define "credible equilibrium" as one at which no credible deviations
exist.
To make things precise, we need to establish some notation. Let I' -(T, P,U, C, p, h) be
a game of perfect recall with utilitiea changing during the play. A behavioral strategy s;,~ of
agent i.j is a probability distribution over the choices c;~ at u;~. We note by 5;,~ the aet of
these strategies. A behavioral strategy for player i is the k;-tuple s; :- (s;,l, s;.zi ..., s;.k; ),
~~A concepl that was íntroduced in Bernheim, Peleg snd Whineton [1987] and in Peleg [1992].12
where s;,~ belongs to 5;.~. Thus, the set of behavioral atrategies for player i is X~-~ 5;.~ -:
S;. An n-tuple of behavioral strategies is s-(si, ..., 9n) and the set of these n-tuples,
called also "points" is S- X;~ S;.
Let Q be a set of agents (to be thought of as belonging to the same player). We denote
by -Q the set M`Q, where M is the set of all agenta (not only of the same player). For a
point s, we denote by sQ the vector of strategies~s (s;,~); ~Ea. Similarly, SQ :- X;.~EQ S;.~.
For simplicity we also write
(s-; ~, s;.~) which expresses a deviation of agent i.j to s;.~, instead of the more precise
notation (s-l;~l, s;.~).
Given an n-tuple of behavioral strategiea s, it induces s probability diatribution on the
endpoints. Thus, we can denote by h;~(s) the utility of agent i.j for this lottery. For s and
sc in S, we write s' ~;.~ s iff h;,~(s') ~ h;,~(s).
Finally, for a given s and a given agent i.j, we denote by I';.~ the game obtained from I'
by converting the strategy of every agent, other than the strategies of i.j and the agents of
player i that play after him,1e to chance mechanisms playing as in s(and converting the
information seta of the chance mechanisms to aingletons). I';.j is the game that the players
think at the start of the game that agent i.j is facing, given that every agent other than he
and his followers follow s. Note that I';.~ is a 1-person game-posaibly with several agenta.
We can now introduce our solution concept. Note that, becauae the game is of perfect
recall, the probability distributions on the nodes of the information sets of agents of player
i, given that they are reached, depend only on the strategy (n - 1)-tuple17 s-; and not
on s;. Indeed, if a non-singleton information set of an agent i.jo is reached, all previous
choices taken by player i are known, the information set results from not knowing choices
takcu by cha.ucc and by othcr playcrs. The probabilities on its nodes can be calculatcd
from p and s-;.
DEF~NIT~oN 3.1. Let T-(T, P, U, C, p, h) be a game of perfect recall with utilitiea chang-
ing during the play. Let s be an n-tuple of behavioral atrategies. Let Q be a set of agents
1sStrictly speaking, we should fix an order on the agents to make it a vector.
18We say that i.j plays after ;.jo if every path from u;~ to the root paeaea through u;~o.
l~a-; is ashort notationfor (s~,...,a;-l,a;~t,...,e„).13
of player i, i~ 0, containing an agent i.ja and aome of i's agenta that play that play after
i.jo. A strategy ~Q~-tuple s4 ia said to be a credióle deviation Jrom s, atrack 6y agent i.ja
wing Q, if:
(i) s' ~;.~s s, where s' :- (sQ,s-Q), i.e., agent f.ja atrictly prefers that everyone plsy
according to s' rather than everyone play according to s.
(n) s' ~;,j (s-~.i,e;.j) for all i.j E Q, i.j ~ i.ja. Thus, agent i.j strictly prefera to plsy
s;.~ rather than s;,j, given that the other agenta play ae dictated by s'. We ehall
refer to this condition by saying that i,j prefera to comply with s'.
(iii) No agent of i, whether in Q or not, that plays nfter i.ja, can atrike a credible
deviation from s'.
Note that the defínition ia not circular, becauae the relation "plays after„ is acyclic.
DlsCUSSION. We view the deviation as a set ofinstructiona sQ given by i.ja to the membera
of Q. Condition (i) states that í.ja prefers that these instructions are obeyed, given that
agents of -Q continue1e to follow s. Indeed, otherwise, why did he give auch inatructiona?
Note that this implies that i.jo ia reached with positive probability under s, becauae prior
to i.jo there is no distinction between elements of s and s'. Condition (ii) impliea that each
member i.j of Q is reached with poaitive probability under s'. When i.j comea to play he
has two suggested strategiea: The original auggestion s;,j dictated by s and the deviation
suggestion s;.j. Which one will he obey? The condition atatea that each member of Q,
except19 perhaps i.jo, actually prefers to comply with s'. In other words, when i.j of Q
comes to play (equivalently, when i.j conaidera playing in I';:j), he prefera s;.i to s;,i, given
that other agents follow s'. Thus, such an agent has an incentive to follow the instructiona.
Following tlte spirit of Naah equilibrium, we took the poaition that even if i.j ia indifferent
betwecn s~ ~ and s;,~, he will not switch~o to s; ~.
But there remains some doubt: What guarantees do the agenta have that every agent of
i will follow s'? Perhaps one can strike a deviation from s'! Condition (iii) is introduced
~aSuUeequently we ahall see that he csn count on thia.
~aThie exception wae put in order to allow for i.ja to continue ueing s;,jo. If other sgente are taked to
continue ueing s;,~ , we simply do not include them in Q.
~oOne could thin~ of a different poeition (aee Section 8).14
to prohibit this possibility. The playera that come to play after i.ja can rest asaured that
none of them can deviate from s' in a credible way. Condition (iii) gives our definition a
recursive flavor, and it worka because, for every agent i.j after i.ja, the "i-length"Zl of I';~j
is smaller than the i-length of I';~~o.
REMnaK. Although it is reasonable to assume that an agent of i not only remembers what
choices other agents of i took in the past, but also knows by what probability distribution
they were obtained, we do not make this assumption. So, if, say, an agent i.ji, decides to
"cheat" and move from a completely mixed atrategy s;,j, to another one, any agent i.jz
after him will not recognize that cheating took place. As has been said above, knowing
s-; and knowing that he was reached, is sufficient, in a game of perfect recall, for agent
i.j2 to compute all the probabilities at his information set. In fact, sometimes an agent i.j
can predict that i.jo was cheating and this will not change his evaluation and behavior, as
the next example shows.












Figure 4. A credible deviation that will be
violated
~i By "i-length" we mean the longeat path from an agent i.j, i~ 0, to an endpoint.15
Let sl,~ -(1~2,1~2), sl,z -(1,0,0), s1.3 -(1,0,0). A credible deviation by 1.1, using
all the agents, may be: s~.~ -(1~2,1~2), si.z -(0,1,0), si.~ -(0,1,0). It ie credible,
because after 1.1 plays, every agent is gaining and maximizing under s'. Neverthelesa, 1.1
is actually likely to deviate and play (0,1), to get 3 instead of 2.5. Now, if 1.2 knew that
he was cheating he could punish him for hia "betrayal", say, by playing (0, 0,1), but we do
not need to go into such considerationa. In fact, we ahaU later prove (Theorem 5.1) that
if i.jo has a credible deviation from s, then he has another credible deviation from s in
which it does not pay him to move away.
With the above discussion and remark we can now state our main definition.
DEFINITION 3.3. Let I' be a game with perfect recall and utilities changing during the
play. An n-tuple s of behavioral strategies is called a credible equilibrium if there are no
credible deviations from it; i.e., if there doea not e~rist an agent i.jo and a coalition Q and
a vector of behavioral atrategies sQ which constitute a credible deviation from s.18
4. Existence theorems
We start by showing that in ordinary gamea, the set of Nash equilibria (Nash [1951]) and
the set of credible equilibria coincide. This substantiatea the claim that we are extending
the Nash's solution to games with utilities changing during the play.
THEOREbt 4.1. Let I' -(T, P, U, C,p, h) be a game of perfect recall in which, for each
player, the utility functions of his agents coincide.22 Let I" be the ordinary representation
of this game23. The set ofcredible equilibria (CrE) ofI' is equal to the set ofNash equilibria
(NE) of I".
PROOF: If s E NE in I" then s E CrE in I', because no deviation by an agent of a player,
uaing a set of agents of that player, can satisfy condition (i) of Definition 3.1.
Conversely, if s~ NE in I", then there exista a deviation s4 by player i, which is a
best reply to s-; and player i, and therefore each of hia agenta, prefers s' :- (sQ,s-Q)
to s. Lct i.j~, i.j2, ..., i.jk be the "first rnembers" of Q; nantely, the members of Q
whose paths to the root do not contain other members of Q. Because the game is of
perfect recall, each agent i.j,,, v - 1, 2, ..., k, can compute his expected payoff ín I'~ ~~ ,
both under s and under24 s'. The difference between these expected payoffs depends only
on actions taken by the members of Q„ :- {members of Q who are agents in I';.~~ }. The
strategy combination sQ~, which is s' restricted to Q,,, is a maximizing strategy of player
i in I'~ i~. Moreover, since s~ NE, at least one agent, say i.ji, is reached with positive
probability under s and strictly prefers s' :- (sQ~ , s-Q~ ) to s in I';.~~ . We now modify sQ~
by working backwards from the endpoints on members of Qr . If an agent i.j in Qi , in his
turn, is indifferent between s;.~ and s;,~, given that his information set is reached2S and
the strategies of players after him have been already determined, let him switch to s;.~.
~~Strictly apeaking, we should have added ~whenever defined" (see Figure 2). However, credible equilibria
do not depend on utilities of an agent o(f paths in which he plays, so we might as well aesume that the
utility functiona are defined at all endpointa.
~,Compare Figurea 2 and 3.
~~Le., when hia followera in I'~ ~~ play as dictated either by e, or by s~, reapectively.
~SWe also asaume that he can 6e reached with poaitive probsbility if player i plsysappropriately. Remember
that in this case the probability distribution on the nodes of his information set is determined by the
strategy combination e-;. If he cannot be reached, no matter what i doea, he cannot compute the
probabilitiea, but we can safely require thst he playa s;,j.After each awitch, player i will atill be playing a beat reply in r'. After all these ewitchea
there will be agents of Qt that are reached with zero-probability under the new atrategies.
Let them too switch to play as in s(if they have not akeady awitched). Denote by Qz the
cnembera of Qt who still play as in s', Qz ~ 0. sQ~ is atill a maximizing atrategy in r;.i~.
We claim that s4i is a credible deviation from s, struck by i.ji. Indeed, we akeady know
that i.j~ prefers s' :- (sQ~,s-Q~). Qz consiste ofexactly thoee agenta who prefer to follow
sc when they conte to play. Finally, all agents of i have the same utility function and, after
i.ji, no agent can do better than the above maximizing strategy; so, no agent after i.j~
can strike a credible deviation from s'. ~
It follows from Theorem 4.1 that CrE is not empty for ordinary games of perfect recall.
However, we need to establish existence in general as well. Thia will be done as a corollary
to the following theorem which shows that CrE containa the set of agcnt form perfect
equilibria (APE) (see Selten [1975]).
TxeoeEM 4.2. Let r -(T, P,U, C,p, h) be a game ofperfect recall with utilities changing
during the play. Let r' be the agent form game obtained from r by considering diáerent
agents as different players. If s is a perfect equilibrium in r' then s is credible in r.
PROOF: s ia a limit of a"test sequence" (sk), k- 1,2,..., where sk E NE in a"perturbed
agent form game" rk. rk is a game having the same T, P, U, C, p, h as r, but the
behavioral strategies at each choice c are restricted ao that the probability to chooae c is
not smaller than some positive number ó~, with E~Ep~.;~lÀ~ C 1 for every information aet
u;i, and limk~ao ó~ - 0, all c.
Suppose s is not credible in r, then there exists an agent i.jo who can strike a credible
deviation sQ. Let i.L be a last agentZa in Q. Agent i.e prefers to play s; ~ rather than s;.~
in r;~i, given that the agents that follow him play as in s, because for these agenta there
ís no distinction between s' and s and because the deviation was credible. Thie preference
will not change if we modify s;.i and s alightly. Modify s~.~ to s~'~ which is poaitive in all
components, so that it is a legitimate atrategy in rk for sufiiciently large k. Modify s to sk
and one obtains s~'t ~;.t sk~ in (rk);~i for aufficiently large k. This meana that sk is not in
7eNamely, an agent thst aRer him all agenta, if exiat, pl~y in e' as in e.18
NE in I'k, because in I'k u;~ is rea~ched with positive probability under sk, a contradiction.
~
CoROLLARY 4.3. The set of credible equilibria is never empty.








Figure 5. A credible equilibrium not in APE
One may wonder if all credible equilibrium points are in APE. That this ia not the case
even in ordinary gasnes follows from Theorem 4.1, because there are ordinary ga.mes wíth
NE ~ APE. For a simple exa.mple which is not an ordinary game conaider Figure 5. It
shows that the couccpt of CrE peruiits a certain amount of punishment.
REMnRK. An agent form subgame perfectness is not sufl'icient for credibility. A simple
example is given in Figure 6. (The azcs denote the credible deviation.)19
utility of agent 1.1: 0
utility of agent 2.1: 0














Figure 6. An agent form subgame perfect
equilibrium which is not in CrE20
5. Some properties of the set of credible equilibria
In thia section we ahall look more critically at the concept "credible equilibrium". We
shall try to find flaws and investigate their seriouanesa. Take, first, the concept "credi-
Me dcviation". Suppow~ .v is not credible. Can we alwaya recommend a"beat credible
deviation"? The anawer is negative as can be aeen in Figure 7.
1.1
Figure 7. A c:~se iu which there doea not exiat
a best credible deviation
Here, s-(Ri,RZ,La) is not credible. The only credible deviations are those struck by
agent 1.1, inatructing all the agents to move to s~ :- (Ll, Lzi ~( z - E)M3, ( z~ e)R3~), 0 G
e G Z. Note that s' is a credible equilibrium. Of courae, agent 1.1 would like to choose e
as small as possible, but he cannot take e- 0, because then 1.2 will not cooperate. Note
that thia is a consequence of the position we took in Definition 3.1, that cooperation can
only be taken if there is real gain.
A more aerious criticism, at least aesthetically, is the fact that CrE is not necessarily
closed. Consider, for example, the 2-person game in Figure 8, in which agenta 1.1 and 1.2
move Li and Lz, and agent 2.1 mixea between L3 and R3 with probabilities (1-e,e). For21
every e, 0 G e c 1, this is a credible equilibrium. It ce.ases to be, if E- 0.
1.1
utility of agent 1.1
utility of agent 1.2









Figure 8. A case in which CrE is not a cloeed set
Note that this example hinges on our conservative stand that an agent will cooperate
only in face of a gain.
In Section 3 we presented an example of a credible deviation (Example 3.2) that wae
certain to be violated by the deviating agent himself. This was possible because of the need
to keep DeHnition 3.1 recursive, and therefore meaningful. We argued that nevertheless
each agent of Q, after i.jo, would still prefer to obey sQ. Fortunately, we do not have to
defend this argument ti..ny further, in view of the following theorem which shows that we
may just as well restrict sQ to ca.ses in which i.ja too cannot further violate.
THEOREM 5.1. Us4 is a credible deviation from s by an agent i.ja, táen there eziats a
deviation s~ from s, by táe same ~gent, sucó that he too cannot strike acredible devíation
from s' :- (sQ,s-o).
PROOF: The proof involves several steps.
STEp 1. Denote by A' the set of pure choices used by i.js with positive probability
under s;.~o. We can and do assume that by playing s;.~o agent i.js ia maximizing under
the condition that he must choose from A' and that all the agenta that play after him
(not neceasarily only agents of i) obey s'. Indeed, if not, replace s;.~o by s;.~o in which
i.jo is maximizing under the restrictions stated above. Let Q be a subset of Q, reached2'l
with poaitive probability under s:- (s;,i„sQ`t~~al,s-Q) and not containing i.jo. The
combination (s; ~a, s4) is a credible deviation from s, struck by i.jo, which satisfies the
maximizing requirement.
STEp 2. Denote by B the set of all agents of i that play after i.jo and are reached with
positive probability under s'. Denote by C the set of all agenta of i that follow pathwise
agents of B, but reached with probability 0 under s'.
We shall ahow that if there exists a credible deviation s'D fmm s', atruck by i.jo, then
D fl (B U C) - B. Suppose D fl B~ ~ then there ie a last agent i.j~ in D fl B, i.e., an
agent such that those that follow him, and play differently under s' and s", are reached
with probability 0 under s'. Let D` consist of i.j~ and the agents in D that play after
him. We claim that s'D, is a credible deviation from s', struck by i.jl-thus arriving at a
contradiction because s' was credible. To verify the claim, observe that conditions (ii) and
(iii) of Definition 3.1 are satisfied for s'ó, , because s'D was a credible deviation struck by i.ja
and because every player after i.j~ is also a player after i.jo. More ca.re is needed to verify
wndition (i). Consider the game I'~~~, and denote by s" the re~triction of s" to thia game.
We know that in I';~~~ , s" r;,~, (s" ~~ ~t 1, s;.~~ ), because s'ó was a credible deviation from
s', struck by i.jo and i.j~ plays after him (and is reached with positive probability both
under s' and under s"). What we have to show is that in I';~~1, s" ~;,~, (s' {; ~11, s~ il ).
This, in fact, is the case, because i.j~ was a last agent in D fl B. Thus, in I';~~t, every
agent i.j after i.jl, for whom s;'i ~ s;,~, is reached under s' with probability 0, so there is
no change in payoffs if we require such agents to play s,l~ instead of s;.~.
Since s;'~ - s;.~ for every agent in B, it follows that every agent in C is reached with
probability 0 under s", therefore D fl C- 0.
STEP 3. We have shown that s" - s' on paths after i.ja, reached with positive probability
under s' and their continuations. Thus, the support A" of s;'~o muat contain choices other
than the choices in A', then A" fl A' - 0 and s" directs the play to paths diajoint from
those reached with positive probability under s' and their continuation. As in Step 1, we
can and do assume that i.jo is maximizing given that he is restricted to A" and the other
agents play according to s".29
STEP 4. If there exiats a credible deviation sË from s", atruck by i.ja, then, as in Step 2,
E`{i.jo} doea not contain agente of i reached under s" with poeitive probability or agenta
of i that follow such agents. By argumenta aimilar to thoae given in Step 2, it doea not
contain agenta of i reached with poaitive probability under a', and pathwiae followera of
such agents. Thus, if s;'~o ie maximizingon ita support, it directa the play to patha different
from the paths supported by s' or s".
STEP 5. We continue in this fashion until we reach a credible deviation s~) from an
aFk-'),
struck by i.jo and player i.ja cannot atrike a credible deviatioa from sQ), neither alone,
restricted to the support of s;~o, nor by directing the play to other paths, becauae euch
paths are not available.
STEP 6. 9C) is also s credible deviation from s, atruck by i.ja. Indeed by tranaitivity,
s(k) };.~o s~k-~) ~;.i, -.. ~;.ia s' ~;,i, s; for every agent i.j of G, s;~-~) is identical
to s;.~ and he prefers to comply with s~k); and neither i.jo, nor his followera can strike a
credible deviation. ~
A credible eyuilibrium need not be ANE, becauae agenta off the patha of the play may
sometimes act "irrationally". Figure 9 provides such an example. However, if one thinka
this ia undesirable, one can find comfort in the following theorem.
1.1
Figure 9. A credible equilibrium which is not
in ANE24
THEOREM 5.2. The paths that are supported by a credible equilibrium are also supported
by a credible equilibrium which is also a Nasó equilibrium for the agent form game.
For the proof we need the following
LEMMA 5.3. Let s be a credibJe equilibrium and let i be a player. There exists an n-tuple
ofstrategies s, such that
(1) s induces the same probability diatribution as s on the set of nodes. In fact, it
coincides with s at a11 ínformation sets reached under s with positive probability.
(2) Every agent i.k ofi is mazimizing in s, namely he is maavmizinghis expected payoff
given that all other agents obey s.
(3) s is a credible equilibrium.
(4) Every agent j.k, j~ i, if he was maximizing under s, 6e is sti11 maximizing under
s.
PftooF: As usual, we consider s-; fixed and known to player i. We construct s succes-
sively, backwards eliminating agents i.k who are not maximizing.
Let i.k be a last agent who is not maximizing. Temporarily replace s;,k by a pure strategy
s;,k which is a best reply for him. This necessarily directs the play to paths not supported
by s, because s was a credible equilibrium. Along these new paths we modify s by backward
induction on the agents of i, after i.k, instructing each of them to employ best reply, given
that Le is rcuched,27 amd kcepint; with s whcnever therr, is indiffcrence Fuid whenever he
cannot be reached. Agent i.k cannot gain by these modifications, compared to s, because
if he could, he could also strike a credible deviation from s, giving himself and his followers
the same instructions. So we let him revert to s;.t. The resulting modification satisfies (1)
with s being the modified strategy n-tuple. It is also credible, because all modifications
were done on unreachable paths that only i.k could direct to them, which he would not
because it were not profitable.
Agent i.k may perhaps, still gain by picking up another pure strategy instead of s;.k. We
a~We remind the reader that if an agent is reached, then, becauae the game is of perfect recall, he can
compute the probabilitiea of reaching each node of hia information eet snd theae probabilitiea depend only
on a-;.zs
eliminate such avenues successively in a similar fashion until eventually i.k ie maximizing
with respect to the modified strategy n-tuple.
This process ís repeated until all agents of i are maximizing and so (1)-(3) are
satisfied.
For agents of other players, if they are off the aupport of s(which is also the support of
s), they are maximizing sutomatically. If they are in the aupport and maximizing under
s, they are also maximizing under s, because s- s in the support and they cannot lead
the game to paths where s~ s. This is condition (4). ~
Pxooe oF TxeoxeM 5.2: Apply the lemma conaecutively for all the players. The fmal
modification will be in ANE, because every agent will be maximizing. Moreover, thie
modification coincides with s on the patha aupported by s. ~26
8. Examples
The purpose of the examples in thia section is to illustrate aome featurea of the credible
deviations and get a better underatanding of them.
EXAMPLE 6.1. Strategy (Li,L2) in Figure 10 ia not credible in spite of the fact that
agent 1.2 receives lesa than the oríginal payment under the credible deviation (R1,R2).
Here we see the importance ofthe timing of decisiona. When 1.2 plays, he has no alternative
but to comply with the deviation. Thus, within the agents of a given player, the concept
of credible equilibrium has some flavor of perfection, although in general, as we have seen,
CrE may even contain points not in ANE.
1.1
Figure 10. A credible deviation that harms
an agent
EXAMPLE 6.2. Strategy (L1,Lz) is credible in the game of Figure 11. An instruction
(Rl , Rz) by agent 1.1, although promising to increase agent 1.2's payoff, is not safe for agent
1.1. When agent 1.2 comes to play he has no motivation to move to RZ. In Section 8 we
shall propose other variants under which (Rl, Rz) will be considered a credible deviation.
EXAMPLE 6.3. Consider the game in Figure 12. Here, Wife (player 1) and Husband
(player 2) can either "save" (s) or "consumer (c) at various atagea. If both players save at1.1












Figure 12. The saving~consuming game
a11 stages, they can buy a high-quality car. Partial saving ((cl, szi s3) in the figure) allows
them to buy only s low-quality car. Wife ia indifferent between high- and low-quality car.
Husband strongly prefers the high-quality car (for inetance, he needs it to show off). In28
fact, he would "consume" rather than buy the low-quality car. Wife can consume a small
portion without Husband noticing. Alas, when consuming she enjoya her purchase all the
more, and her desire to further consume becomea atronger (say, she bought an expensive
ring and now she neecis a necklace to match). Thie is evident when one comparea the
utility differences between 1.1 and 1.2. The rest of the atory can be read from the figure.
Clearly, (9~,9~,93) is not credible: Wife 1.1 switches to ci. Símilarly, (cl,sz,s3) ia not
credible: Huaband will apend hia money on leisure. Thus, there is no chance of getting
any car using pure strategies. The point (ci,cz,c3) is credible. It yielda (3,4,5) to the
agents. What a sad prospect. But there exiats a credible behavioral strategy that allows
for complete saving with positive probability. It is ([2~3(sl ),1~3(cl )], [1~2(sz ),1j2(cz )], c3).
Under this strategy they will buy a high-quality car with probability 1~3 and a low-quality
car with probability 1~6. The payoffto 1.1 will be 3 and it will be 4 to 2.1. Agent 1.2 will
be "createdn with probability 1~3 and will receive 5. It is interesting to note that if 1.2 had
the same utility function as 1.1, the only equilibrium point would have been (cl,czic3).29
7. Timewise Credible Equilibria
One may question the definition of a credible deviation in two ways:
(1) Is it not an artificial requirement to allow each agent control over only one infor-
mation set? What if the same agent controla several?
(2) Why do we allow a deviating agent to inatruct only agenta that follow him patAwiae?
After all he may derive payments also at paths in which he does not play.
To cope with the above criticism we have to extend the model ofSection 2 by introducing
datee at each information set. This we ahall do in this section and then prove that we do not
get other equilibrium pointa. For the sake of brevity we ahall omit the formal definitions,
which are straightforward extensions of the previous sectiona. First, we ahall provide two
examples to give the reader some insight into the problem. In this section we uae the
convention that nodea in a figure on the same level are played, if reached, at the same time
and that lower nodes are played, if reached, at later dates.
Figure 13. A "counterexamplen
ExnMPLE 7.1. The tree in Figure 13 refera to a one-player one-agent game, but the agent
occupiea two information singletona A and B. It aeems that thia example aupporta theabove criticism: The player cannot benefit by deviating from (L1,L2) at any one node,
but he can benefit by playing (Ri , Rz ).
Thía example is not valid because an agent cannot have two different utilities at any
particular node. This is simply meaningless. We must regard A and B as occupied by
different agents, even if they are sssigned the same date.
Figure 14. A correct representation
EXAMPLE 7.2. Figure 14 is a correct version. It seems, however, that we get a similar
counter example by allowing agent 1.1 instruct himself and 1.2 to move right.
Yes, but why would agent 1.2 obey? If he has to play he knows that 1.1 is not playing,
so he knows he cannot gaiu by dcviation.
We now extend the model of Section 2 by adding a date at each information set and by
allowing the same agent control several information sets that are assigned the same date.
We remind the reader that an agent has exactly one utility function at all endpoints at
which it is defined. We call the various information sets of an agent "aubagenfa" of that
agent. We assume that all subagents of an agent are associated with the same date. Thus,
an agent is a unit that makes a decision on a certain date, based on one utility function. We
modify the definition of a credible deviation of Section 3 by allowing members of Q other31
than i.jv to be agenta of í who play not earlier in time than i.jv. Condition (i) remains
that agent i.jo prefers s' to s. Condition (ii) says that every agent i.j in Q, other than
i.jo, prefera, when he comes to play, s' to (s~;.j, s;.j). Note that when he comea to play he
knows at which information set he is located, so, as far as he ia concerned, only atrategiea by
subagents that arc pathwisc after this information set count for this preference. Condition
(iii) says that every agent after i.jo, timewise, cannot atrike a credible deviation. Since
the number of time periode is finite, we have here a well defined recuraive definition. We
call it a"timewise credible deviation jrom s, bg i.jo, wing Q". The following two lemmas
and theorem prove that with this extenaion we do not get different credible equilibrium
pointa.~e
In this section we are using the adverbs "pathwise" and "timewise". "Pathwise" refers
to notions related to the tree. "Timewise" refers to notions related to the dates. Thus,
saying "playing timwise after an agent" is not the same as saying "playing pathwise after
an agent". It is reasonable to require, and we do require, that the latter implies the firat.29
LEMMA 7.3. If s4 is a timewise credible deviation from s by an agent i.jo, then there
exists a timewise credible deviation from s by a subagent ofi.jo, in the game I", obtained
fmm the original game I' by regarding each subagent as a different agent.
PAOOF: Denote by i.joi, i.joz, ..., i.7ok, k~ 1, the subagents of i.jo. They are all supposed
to choose a move on the same date, if the play reaches them. They all have the same
utility function.
We regard s-; as fixed and known to player i. Because the game ia of perfect recall,
each subagent knows the probability disribution at the nodes of his information set, if
the play reaches him. Given either s; or s;, he can compute hia expected payoff at the
endpoints.30 In particular, he caa compute the aum of the expected payoffa at endpointa
that follow him. We shall call this sum the pathwise expected payoff of the aubagent. The
~eTo aimplify the expoaition, we asaume thst agenta do not employ correlated strategiea smong their
aubagents. Thia is legitimate, because the game ie of perfect recall, eoonly induced probability distributiona
at the varioua information aeta matter.
t95ee the A.emark at the end of this aection.
3oNote that prior in time to i.jo, a and a~ coincide.32
expected payoff of agent i.ja is a weighted average of the pathwiae expected payoffa of the
subagents i.ja,,, v - 1, 2, ..., k. Since s' ~;,i, s, at least one subagent, say i.jo~ , has a
higher pathwise expected payoffunder s' than under s. We ahall now construct a timewise
credible deviation from s in I", struck by agent i.jol. It is aimply s'Q. In other words,
instead of saying that i.jo struck sQ, we now say that i.jo~ atrikes a deviation by giving the
same instructions. Indeed, condition (i) is fulfilled becauae of the way i.jo~ was selected.
When an agent i.jp in Q comes to play he knows that he is, say, at u(i.jy~). He prefers to
comply with s' in I", because he had the same preferencea in I' and his pathwise expected
payoff is the same in both games. This is condition (ii). ff in T' there is a subagent i.jy
who plays timewise after i.joi, who can strike a timewise credible deviation from s', then,
in I', i.j could strike the same credible deviation from s', which is impossible. This proves
condition (iii). ~
LEMMA 7.4. Let i be a game in wiiich every agent occupies a single information set. If
an agent i.ja can strike a timewise credible deviation sQ from s, then there is an agent
who can strike a patl~wise credible deviation from s.
PROOF: If there exists an agent i.ji in Q, jl ~ jo, not pathwise after i.jo, then there exists
an agent i.j2 in Q, not pathwise after i.jo, who is timewise last to be reached with positive
probability also under s. This agent, when he comes to play, prefers s' to (s';.~~ , s;.J, ),
which means that he also prefers s' to s, because, by choosing s; ~~ he diverts the play
to paths in which there is no distinction between s and s', or to paths in which, under
s, it does not matter whether s;.~ or s;.~ is played. This is condition (i) for a deviation
s4. :- sQ. , struck by i.jz from s, where Q' consists of i.jz and members of Q that play
pathwise after i.jz. Any such member other than i.jz prefers to comply with s", becauae
he preferred to comply with s' and his preferences do not depend on moves taken not
pathwise after him. This is condition (ii) of Definition 3.1. Similarly, no agent pathwise
after i.j2 can strike a credible deviation from s", because if he could, he could also strike
the same deviation from s'. ~
THEOREM 7.5. Let I' be a game with dates and with agents controllingseveral information
sets. Let I" be the game obtained froin I' by regardingsubagents as different agents and33
by removing the date Jabels. The set of timewise credible equilibria in I' is identical to the
set of (pathwise) credible equiJibria in I".
PROOF: From Lemmas 7.3 and 7.4, it followa that if s is a pathwiae credible equilibrium
in I" then it is also timewiae credible equilibrium in T. Suppose s is s timewiae credible
equilibrium in I' then, in particular there doea not exist a timewise credible deviation sQ
by a subagent i.jol that uses only membera of Q who follow him pathwise. Therefore, for
any such attempted deviation, either i.joi dcea not prefer s' to s or there exiata a member
of Q(pathwise) after i.jo~ who would rather comply alone with s, or an agent i.jl in I'
who playa tiniewise after i.jo~, caai etrike a timewiae credible deviation s'p from s'. In the
first two cases, s4 is not a credible deviation in I". In the third case s4 would still not
be a credible devíation in I" if i.j~'s deviation from s' uses only subagenta that follow
i.jo~ pathwise. If thia is not the case then there exists in D a last subagent, reachable
with positive probability also under s who can atrike a timewise credible deviation31 to s.
This, however, is impossible, because s was timewise credible. We have proved that s ia
(pathwise) credible in I". ~
REMARK. It should be noted that not every assignment of datea to information sets will
be valid even if the game ia of perfect recall. For example, one cannot play the game of
Figure 15 unless one is equipped with "time machine".
Without the dates this game makes perfect sense: Both players 2.1 and 3.1 have to act
without knowing if the other one has already made his choice.
a' Because preferring to comply with s~~, when nuhed, meana, preterring e" to s. See slno the proof of
l,emma 7.2.1.1
Figure 15. A game Lhat is impossible to play35
8. Other varianta
In Section 3 we took the position that when an agent in the deviating coalition ia
indifferent to complying with s' or with s, he will not switch. Thia position gave riae to
requirement (ii) in Definition 3.1. We could take the other poaition, that he will comply
with s' in case of indifference. After all, what one promiaea to oneself is perhaps more
important than what one promises to others... With this poaition in mind, an intereating
variant may be to omit requirement (ii) altogether. Accordingly, we ahall call a deviation
~4 KatiYfyiuR (i) nud (iii) of Definition 3.1 an optimi.~tic r,rr.diólr, deviation and we define
aii optimistic credible equilibrium as au n-tuple of atrategies from which there do not exist
optimistic credible deviations.
Figure 16. An OCrE which is not cloaed
The set of optimistic credible equilibria (OCrE) coincides with NE in ordinary gamea,
and the proof ia essentially the same as in Theorem 4.1. Thus, OCrE is also an extenaion
of the Nash solution concept. It, too, ia not necessarily a closed set as the example in
Figure 16 shows.In this example (Mi, L~, [(1 - e)L3,ER3]) is in OCrE whenever 0 C e C 1 but if e- 0,
agent 1.1 can instruct agent 1.2 to move right, and thia is an optimistic credible deviation.
We believe that OCrE is worth studying, because of its simpler definition as compared
to CrE and because it yields inter~~sting strategiee. The set OCrE need not contain APE





Figure 17. An example in which OCrE fl APE - 0
Here, (M1,LZ,La) is the unique perfect equilibrium point for the agent form game.
It is not optimiatically credible because 1.1 can instruct 1.2 to move right. The point
(M~ , Rz, L3 ) is both in CrE and in OCrE.
Unfortunately, OCrE may be empty, as can be seen in the game of Figure 18.
In thia example 1.2 and 2.1 play matching pennies. Thus, if s E OCrE then s1,2 -
(1~2,1~2) and s2,~ -(1~2,1~2). But then, 1.1 can atrike an optimistic credible deviation
by instructing 1.2 to move "left„. One may feel that this counter example is su~cient to
discard OCrE. We do not think so. OCrE conceptuaAy is simpler than CrE and if it does
contain some points, these may have some advantage.
In another variant of the OCrE concept, one requires that in case ofindifference between














if, when the instruction wns given, agent i.j was promised some gain in s~ as compared to
s. It is as if i.jo "tells" i.j in Q: "If I would not have struck the deviation and we all played
according to the original point s, you would have received a certain amount, a. Now that I
strike the deviation, you will get 6, and b ie greater than a. Z~ue, when it will be your turn
to play you will get 6 even if you play s;.~, but where will your gratitude to me-your own
flesh and blood-be for the profits I threw upon you?" We feel that this concept ehould
also be studied, but we must say that it has one drawback: It requires utilities of agent i.j
to be defined ev~n if s is played, perliapa under outcomes in which i.j is not even created.38
9. Other applications
Up to now we restricted ourselves to one scenario: The players are individuals who play
a game in extensive form and thcir utilities may change during the play. But the model
that we constructed may be useful in other applications. In this section we shall discuss
two of them.
A. VIOLATION OF VON NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN INDEPENDENCE AXIOM. The last
decade, which has witnessed a proliferation of studies of generalizations of von Neumann-
Morgenstern [1947] expected utility theory, saw a revival of interest in the changing-
preference problem. Indeed, in many models, the violation of von Neumann-Morgenstern
independence axiom is equivalent to dynamic inconsistency in deciaion makers' prefer-
ences in a multi-stage decision problem under risk (see Hammond [1988], Karni and Safra
[1989a, b], Machina [1989]). Differently put, the violation of the axiom is (at least techni-
cally) equivalent to a change in the decision-maker's utility function (over lotteries). Thus,
our concept of CrE may be applied to such models as well.
B. WHEN A PLAYER REPRESENTS A GROUP OF INDIVIDUALS. In many game models, a
player is not an individual. It can be a state, a political party, an organization, etc. In
such cases it almost always makc,~s no sense to attribute to such a player a von Neumaim-
Morgenstern utility function. We do not refer here only to situationa that fall under Con-
dorcet paradox (Condorcet [1785]), but to a more fundamental fact that a non-individual
player may not have a utilíty function. What is the utility function of a state? The utility
of the farmers? The utility of the manufacturers? The white collar people? The plain
citizen? The prime minister? It is more natural to regard a player in auch cases as an
instruction-giving unit tltxt reprc~enta groups3~~ach endowed with its own utility func-
tion. Each such group is capable of deviating from the instructions given by the players
and will deviate if it finds the deviation profitable and safe.
Applications of game theory in which players in the game model are not individuals are
3~Strictly speaking-individuala who sometimes are aggregated into groups to render further analyeis
feasible.as
numerous, and among the most important. If the model developed in thia paper could be
used to handle them, that would be a significant contribution to applied game theory. For
example, a game theorist could tell the inatruction-giving unit: "You can, of courae, decide
on any strategy combination, but only credible combinations will be abided by. Here is
the set of those combinations that are likely to be followed." Unfortunately, the preaent
model can handle only cases where perfect recall prevails.
For applications diacuased here, perfect recall is not a reasonable requirement. Why
should the farmers know what the manufacturera did in the past, for example?33 Of
course, if perfect recall does not prevail, one cannot limit oneaelf to behavioral atrategies,
but this is not the main source of diffïculty. Ta1ce, for example, the one-person game of
Figure 19.
1.1
Figure 19. A credible deviation that does not
make sense
Here, (Li,L2) is not credible because agent 1.1 can instruct himself and agent 1.2 to
move right. If agent 1.2 knew that agent 1.1 was moving right, he would have certainly
chosen to comply. But he does not know, and if he complies, then it behooves agent 1.1
to remain at Li so as to get 3. So, the deviation (Ri, Rz) ie perhapa not safe, in spite of
the fact that it complies with Definition 3.1.
3JOf course, if the instructions can only by delivered publicly, an it ehould be in most caxa of democrstic
countriea, we can claim that perfect recall prevaila.90
If the game lacks perfect recall, difficulties start with the construction ofthe model itself.
The model should allow an agent to occupy several information aets, belonging to different
dates, if dates are specified. It should be clear who plays after whom, so as to know to
whom instructions of the deviating player can be given. The atrategy space should also be
clearly apecified: Do we allow agents to use correlated strategiea, for example? Suppoae
the agents have agreed on a strategy combination and that some agents deviated in auch a
way that othera do not know it, due to the imperfect recall. And suppoae that, contrary to
the agreement, an agent finds himself at an information set that should have been reached
with zero probability. He knows that a violation occurred but often does not know which
one. How will he interpret the observation? We see that with lack of perfect recall all the
problematic issues of "refinements" pop up in spite of the fact that our goal was to only
generalize the Nash solution. Thus, applications of CE to gamea where a player represents
several groups is at present quite limited. The extension of this model to games without
pcrfect recall reiusins a challeuging tupic fur further research.41
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